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MARINE INSURANCE - IS THE DOCTRINE
"UTMOST FAITH" OUT OF DATE?
The Hon. Justice

FROM

THE COFFEE

HOUSE

TO GLOBAL

8 NLSJ 34

OF

MD Kirby AC CMG*

INDUSTRY

Let us start with a little history. It is always enlightening
in the law, but
especially
in the field of marine insurance which is of ancient origin. The
systems of indemnity known as "bottomry", "respondentia"
and general average are the forebears to modern marine insurance.l The modern form of that
insurance originates, as legend has it, from the practices of the 12th Century
Lombard merchant. By the 15th Century, those merchants, to the irritation of
locals, controlled much of the overseas trade of England, and hence of insurance over it. But by the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the practice of marine
insurance in England was becoming well developed. The Lombard merchants
had begun to pack their parchments and to leave England.2 Just as Mr. Scott's
untimely passage beneath a loading crane from which six bags of sugar rained
down upon him,3 Mrs. Donoghue's adverse consumption
of a cocktail of aerated ginger-beer and snail4 and Mrs. Miller's summertime fear of soaring cricket
balls plummeting down her gardenS have become legal folklore, so too has the
17th Century London coffee-house
of Mr. Edward Lloyd.
Very little is known either about Mr. Lloyd or his Tower Street coffee
house. But it appears that he took no personal part in the practice of underwriting, "contenting
himself with providing congenial surroundings
and facilities
for his patrons to do business until his death in 1713. Lloyd's chief bequest to
posterity was his name and the coffee house which bore it. "6

..

President
of the Court of Appeal of New Soulh Wales, Sydney, Australia.
The author
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the assistance
given by Mr Eugene Romaniuk,
Research
Officer to the
Court of Appeal, in the preparation
of this paper.

Bottomry was a system whereby

a loan, secured by the vessel, taken out by a ship owner
for the purposes of a seafaring venture would be forgiven if the vessel was lost. Repayment of the loan was conditional
on the vessel's safe arrival. Respondentia was a system
like bottomry,
but the loan had as its security the cargo of the vessel. Average was a
system of indemnity
whereby various parties to a venture contribute
rateably to indemnify another party to the same venture upon principles of common equity. See A L Parks,
The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance and Average, 4(1988).

2

5

pp. I -6.
Scott v The London and St. Katherine Docks Company (1865) 3 H&C 596; 159 ER 665.
Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) AC 562 (HL).
Miller v. Jackson (1977) I QB 966 (CA).

6

Parks,

3
4

Ibid,

supra n. 1 at p.8.
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Then, as now, willing parties for fee, individually
or collectively,
took
risks for other merchants against loss at sea: ever a peril of marine adventures.
The decision to accept that risk, and for what price, rested upon the participant
underwriters'
evaluation of the chance of loss having regard to the details of
the voyage provided to them. In those days of marine insurance the knowledge
of factors pertaining to the risk lay almost entirely with the person seeking the
insurance. In Carter v. Boehm Lord Mansfield said:?
Insurance is a contract based upon speculation. The special facts,
upon which the contingent chance is to be computed, lie most
commonly in the knowledge of the insured only: the underwriter
trusts to his representation
and proceeds upon the confidence that
he does not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the underwriter
into a belief that the circumstance
does not
exist, and to induce him to estimate the risque as if it did not
exist.
Proper assessment of such "contingent chance" necessitated
the full and
complete disclosure of all factors to the risk. The common law responded to
this need by holding that all contracts of insurance were contracts uberrimae
fidei.
Each party to the contract must act with the "utmost good faith" in his
or her dealings with the other. 8 This was to be in contrast to the common law's
general laissez-faire
theory to bargains in the general law of contract.9 There
the theoretical underpinning
was the doctrine of caveat emptor. to
In the time which has passed since Mr. Edward Lloyd provided customers with fragrant coffee many things have changed. The relative bargaining
position of marine underwriters and assureds has changed. In those early days
it lay almost solely with the insured. The purpose of the rule was to rectify

7

(1766)

8

See, for example, Seaton v. Heath (1899)
QB 782 (CA) at 792 per Romer LJ; Southem
Cross Assurance Company LId v. Australian Provincial Assurance Association LId (1939)
39 SR (NSW) 174 (FC), at 187; Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed), Vol 25, para 221.
Note however that Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1909; 97 ER

3 Burr 1905 at 1909; ER 1162 at 1164.

I

1162 at 1164 was of the view that the doctrine of "good faith" was applicable
to all
contracts,
not only contracts
of insurance.
The common law of contract has not since
Carter v. Boehm so far developed in that way: See, Pan Atlantic Insurance Co LId v.
Pine Top Insurance Co LId (1994) 3 WLR 677 (HL), at 700 per Lord Mustill, despite
some lingering indications
to that effect. See, for example, the discussion
of Priestley JA
in Renard Constructions
(ME) Pty LId v. Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR
234 (CA), at 263f. See also J Carler "Good faith in Failed Contract
Negotiations",
unpublished,
a paper delivered to the University
of Sydney Faculty of Law Continuing
Legal Education
Program, 17 February 1994.

9

See generally

10

W H Hamilton,
"The Ancient Maxim of Caveat Emptor" (1931)
Law Journal 1133, esp. pp. 1135-1136. See also A G Guest (ed), Benjamin's
Goods, para 777 (3rd ed., 1987).
See generally

D W Greig

and JLR Davis,

The Law of Contract,

22-32

(1987).
40 Yale

Sale of
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that imbalance.ll Today prudent underwriters have largely redressed this information imbalance.12 The law has moved
a great distance from the values
which it embraced in the 18th and 19th Centuries. The perceptions of contemporary society concerning conduct appropriate to a bargain have also changed
since the infant days of marine insurance. Against the background
of these
changes it is timely to ask whether, having regard both to the theory and
practice, the circumstances
of modern times are such that duty of utmost good
faith in marine insurance has become out of date?
THE LA W OF UTMOST
INSURANCE

GOOD FAITH

IN AUSTRALIAN

MARINE

Like many other aspects of Australian law, both common and statute
law, what may be described as "Australian marine insurance law" owes its
origin to the law of England. Indeed, the High Court of Australia recently
commented,
in a rather different context, that" Australian law is not only the
historical
successor of, but is an organic development
from, the law of England."13 While it had been established
that the common law of Australia
could develop independently
of English precedent,I4 as regards the general law
of contract the English law remains particularly
persuasive. IS This is especially so in the present case as the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth)16 is, in
substance,
identical to the English Marine Insurance Act 1906, which represented a "partial codification of the common law".17
THE DUTY OF UTMOST
INS URANCE ACT
Division
II

GOOD FAITH

4 (ss 23-27) of the Marine

-

S. 23 OF THE MARINE

Insurance

Act 1909 (the Act) deals

Pan Atlantic tnsurance co Ltd v. Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd. (1994) 3 WLR 677 (HL), at
717 per Lord Lloyd

of Berwick.

12

The Law Reform

13

Mabo v. The State of Queensland (No.2) (1992)
CJ and McHugh

Commission,

Insurance

Contracts

(ALRC

20), para

175 (1982).

175 CLR I, at 29 per Brennan

J; Mason

J agreeing.

14

Australian Consolidated Press Lid v. Uren (1967)
See also, the Australia Act 1986 (Cth).

15

Geig and Davis,

16

There are constitutional
limitations
upon the Australian Federal Parliament's
Legilsati ve
power to pass laws in respect of insurance.
See generally J Quick and R R Garran, The
Annotated
Constitution
of the Australian
Commonwealth,
The Australian
Book Company. 1901 at ss 160 and 185. Section 6(1) of the Marine Insurance
Act 1909 (Cth)
provides:

supra

117 CLR 221;

(1969)

n. 9 at I

This Act shall apply to marine insurance other than State marine
insurance
marine insurance
extending
beyond the limits of the State concerned.
This paper focuses exclusively
on the operation
of the Federal legislation
it, by virtue of s 6(1), being applicable
to international
transactions.

17

AC 590 (PC).

Pan Atlantic Insurance co Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd. (1994)
at 683.

and to State
in Australia,

3 WLR 677 (HL),
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with disclosure and representations.
Section 23 of the Actl8 expressly imposes
upon the parties to the bargain a duty of utmost good faith. That section makes
it clear that:

(1)

the duty of utmost good faith applies
the assured; 19 and

(2)

if the duty of utmost good faith is breached
may avoid entirely the contract. 20

DISCLOSURE
OF MATERIAL
MARINE
INSURANCE
ACT

to both the underwriter

CIRCUMSTANCES

-

the innocent

Section

23 of the Marine

Insurance

party

S 24 OF THE

Section 24(1) of the Act21 requires that (subject to circumstances
need not be disclosed)22 the assured (or his or her agent)23 must disclose
18

and

which
to the

Act 1909 (Cth) provides:

A contract of marine insurance
is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if
the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by
the other party.
19

See also, Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, at 1909; 97 ER 1162, 1164 per Lord
Mansfield;
Pall Atlalltic Illsurance Co Ltd. v. Pille Top Insurance Co Ltd. (1994) 3 WLR
677 (HL), at 717-718 per Lord Lloyd of Berwick. similarly,
the duty of utmost good
faith may extend to those "who are necessarily
involved in the insurance".
not just the
acutal parties to the contract of insurance:
CE Heath Casualty & General Insurance
Ltd
v. Grey (1993) 32 NSWLR 25 (CA), at 37 per Mahoney JA. See also, KCT Sutton, "The
Duty of Utmost Good Faith" (1994) 22 Australian
Business Law Review 302.

20

R J Lambeth,
...... despite
cally void
initio. See,
and Breach

21

Section

Templeman

on Marine

Insurance

21 (6th ed. 1986) makes

the point

that:

the words used in some of the older judgments
the policy is not automatiin the event of non-disclosure
or misrepresentation
but may be avoided ab
The Law Commission
of England and Wales, Insurance Law: Non Disclosure
of Warranty
(No. 104), para 3.9; (1980)

24(1)

of the Marine

Insurance

Act 1909 (Cth) provides:

Subject to the provisions
of this section, the assured must disclose to the insurer, before
the contract is concluded,
every material circustance
which is known to the assured, and
the assured is deemed to know every circumstance
which, in the ordinary
course of
business,
ought to be known by him. If the assured fails to make such disclosure,
the
insurer may avoid the contract.
22

Subject to inquiry by the insurer, s 24(3)
vides that the assured need not disclose:
(a)

Any circumstance

(b)

Any circustance

which diminishes

of the Marine

Insurance

Act

1909 (Cth)

pro-

the risk;

which is known or presumed

to be known

to the insurer.

The insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge,
and
matters which an insurer in the ordinary course of his business,
as such, ought to
know;

23

(c)

Any circumstance

as to which

(d)

Any circumstance
implied warranty.

which it is superfluous

Where

the contract

of insurance

information

is effected

is waived
to disclose

by the insurer;
by reason

by an agent for the assured,

of any express

or

then subject

to

38
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underwriter
"every material circumstance24 which is known to the assured." By
s 24(1) of the Act, the assured is deemed to know "every circumstance
which,
in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by him" or her. Hence,
the assured is required to disclose both actual and constructive
knowledge of
facts affecting the risk.25 Section 24(1) of the Act also provided:
(a)

that the disclosure by the assured must be made before
tract of insurance is concluded;26 and

(b)

that failure by the assured to make the necessary
the insurer to "avoid the contract",27

THE TEST

OF MATERIALITY

- THE "PRUDENT

the con-

disclosure

allows

INSURER"

Section 24(2) of the Act28 makes tbe "prudent insurer" the applicable
test of "materiality",
By that test, a material circumstance is one "which would
influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or deter-

the provisions
of s 24(3) of the Marine Insurance
Act 1909 (Cth) (circumstance
need not be disclosed),
s 25 of the Marine Insurance Act) 909 (Cth) provides
agent must disclose to the insurer:

which
that the

(a)

every material circumstance
which is known to himself, and an agent to insure is
deemed to know every circumstance
which in the ordinary
course of business
ought to be known by, or to have been communicated
to, him; and

(b)

every material circumstance
which the assured
come to his knowledge
too late to communicate

is bound to disclose.
it to the agent.

unless

it

24

For the purposes
of Division 4 of the Marine Insurance
Act) 909 (Cth), the term "circumstance"
includes "any communication
made to, or information
received
by, the assured": s 24(5) of the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth).

25

See generally
supra
511, at 521-522.

26

For the purposes
Marine Insurance
cluded" when:

n.20 at 26-27.

See also,

Proudfoot

v. Montefiore

(1867)

of Di vision 4 of the Marine Insurance
Act 1909 (Cth),
Act 1909 (Cth)
deems a contract of marine insurance

LR 2 QB
s 27 of the
to be "con-

... the proposal
of the assured is accepted by the insurer, whether the policy be then
issued or not; and for the purpose of showing when the proposal was accepted, reference
may be made to the slip or covering note or other customary
memorandum
of the contract.
27

Provision by s 24(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth) that failure to disclosure
a
material
circumstance
by the assured allows the insurer to avoid the contract
appears
somewhat
unnecessary
having regard to s 23 of the Marine Insurance
Act 1909 (Cth);
full disclosure
of material facts and circumstance
being the cornerstone
of the duty of
utmost good faith. But it underlines
the consequences
of non-disclosure,

28

Section
Every

24(2)

of the Marine

circumstance

in fixing

Insurance

is material

the premium,

"

Act 1909 (Cth)

which would influence

or determining

whether

provides:
the judgment

he will take the risk.

of a prudent

insurer
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mmmg whether he will take the risk" .29 These words suggest that a material
circumstance
is one which would have an effect on the mind of prudent insurer
in determining
whether it will undertake the risk and, if so, for what price
upon what conditions. Such a broad test places an one£ous task on the assured
if it is to comply with the duty. 30 Most recently the English House of Lords in
Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd.31 endorsed
such a broad approach. It held that it is not necessary (indeed, it would be
contrary to the ordinary meaning of the words of the provision), that a material
circumstance
be one that has a "decisive" effect on the insurers acceptance of
the risk, or the price or conditions of that acceptance.
NON-DISCLOSURE
AND CAUSALITY
THE HOUSE OF LORDS

- RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS

IN

While it is clear that the opinion of a particular insured as the materiality of a fact is not determinative,32
debate persists as to whether a particular
insurer who would not have actually been influenced by the assured's full and
proper disclosure ought to be entitled, in the event of non-disclosure
by the
assured to avoid entirely the contract of insurance where such disclosure would
have influenced
a prudent insurer. Arguably, to ignore the insurer's actual
response leads to the "absurd position", to use the words of Kerr J in Berger
v. Pollock,33 "where the Court might be satisfied that the insurer in question
would in fact not have been so influenced even though other prudent insurers
29

At present the weight of judicia] opinion favours the "prudent insurer" test of materiality. Other tests of materiality
include the "reasonable
insured" See, for example, Joel v.
Law Union and Crown Insurance
Co. (1908) 2 KB 863 (CA), at 885; Horne v. Poland
(1922) 2 KB 364, at 366-367; The Guardian Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Condongianis
(1919)
26 CLR 231, at 246-247), the "reasonable
insurer" see, for example,
Soulhern
Cross
Assurance
Co. Ltd. v. Australian
Provincial
Assurance
Association
Ltd. (1939) 39 SR

174 (FC), at ]87-188; Development
& Finance Corp. Ply Ltd. v. Bankers &
Traders Insurance
Co. Ltd. (1971) 2 NSWLR 541 (SC), at 545; March Cabarel Club &
Casino Ltd. v. The London Assurance
(1975) 1 Lloyd's Rep 169 (QB), at (76) and the
(NSW)

"reasonable
or prudent insurer" (see, for example, Woolcotl v. Sun Alliance and London
Co.
Insurance
Ltd. (1978) 1 All ER 1253 (QB), at 1257; Reynolds v. Phoenix Assurance
Ltd. (1978) 2 Lloyd's
Rep 440 (QB), at 459). It may be that the differences
between
these formulations
are merely semantic,
the substance
of all being substantially
the
same. See, Lambert v. Co-operative
Insurance
Society Ltd. (1975) 2 Lloyd's
Rep 485
(CA), at 489; Marene Knitting Mills Pty Ltd v. Greater Pacific General Insurance
Ltd
(91976) 2 Lloyd's Rep 631 (PC), at 642. See also, Barclay Holdings (Ausl) Ply. Ltd. v.
Brilish National Insurance
Co. Ltd. (1987) 8 NSWLR 514 (CA), at 526. Co1l1rast March
(1975) 1 Lloyd's Rep 169 (QB), at
Cabaret Club & Casino Ltd. v. The London Assurance

176.
30

Barclay
NSWLR

Holdings

(Australia)

Ply Ltd v. Brilish

Nalional

31

(1994) 3 WLR 677 (HL), at 682-683, 695-696,705,713

32

See,

for example,

Co. Ltd.

(1987) 8

(1973) 2 Lloyd's

and 714.

The Guardian Assurance
Co. Ltd. v. Condongianis
(1919) 26 CLR
v. Queensland
Insurance Co. Ltd. (1931) 45 CLR 557, at 563.

231, at 246; Saunders
33

Insurance

514 (CA), at 518.

Rep 442 (QB), at 463.

40
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would have been. It would then be a very odd result if the defendant insurer
could nevertheless
avoid the policy".34 It is, as Lord Mustill noted in Pan
Atlantic,35 a "question which concerns the need or otherwise, for causal connection between the misinterpretation
or non-disclosure
and the making of the
contract of insurance." (emphasis added)
Most recently, the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic has given effect to
such an approach. Considering
s 18(2) of the English Marine Insurance Act
1906 (identical to s 24(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth)36 the law
Lords held that, before an underwriter could avoid a contract for non-disclosure, the underwriter had to show that it had actually been induced by the nondisclosure to enter into the policy on the relevant termsY In so concluding, the
House of Lords overrules, in part, that earlier holding of the English Court of
Appeal in Container Transport Inc. v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd.38 ("CIT") which, after a full review of the relevant authorities, had rejected such an approach.39 In Pan Atlantic40 Lord Templeman
said:
"In my opinion

"the judgment

of a prudent insurer"

34

See also, Viola v. Mercantile
Mutual
#60-620 (NSWSC), at 78, 794.

35

(1994)

36

Lord Mustill (ibid. at 713) expressed
the view that the requirement
of a causal connection between the non-disclosure
and entering of the contract of insurance
applied also to
non-marine
insurance.
Earlier in Lambert v. Co-operative
Insurance Society Ltd. (1975)
2 Lloyd's Rep 485 (CA), at 487, 492 and 493 the English court of Appeal held that the
"prudent
insurer" test of materiality
contained in s 18(2) of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906 was applicable
to non-marine
insurance.
In Australia,
the "prudent
insurer" test of materiality
in the context to non-marine
insurance
differs slightly.
The
formulation
of Samuels J in Mayne Nickless Ltd. v. Pegler (1974) I NSWLR 228 (SC), at
239, makes a fact material if it would have "reasonably
affected"
the mind of a prudent
insurer in determining
whether he will accept the risk and, if so, for what price and upon
what conditions.!
The formulation
laid down in the English and Commonwealth
marine
insurance
Acts refers to a fact which would have "influenced"
the mind of a prudent
insurer.
In the Australian
non-marine
context, the formulation
of Samuels J has been
approved
or adopted in subsequent
cases. See, for example, Marene Knitting Mills Pty
Ltd. v. Greater Pacific General Insurance Ltd. (1976) 2 Lloyd's Rep 631 (PC), at 642;
National & General Insurance Co Ltd v. Chick (1984) 2 NSWLR 86 (CA), at 108; Barclay
Holdings
(Aust) Pty Ltd v. British National Insurance
Co. Ltd. (1987) 8, NSWLR 514
(CA), at 520, 523 and 526.

3 WLR 677 (HL),

Insurance

cannot be said

Co. Ltd. (1985)

3 ANZ Insurance

Cases

at 705.

37

(1994)

3 WLR, at 680-681,

38

(1984)

I Lloyd's

6891-682,

39

See also, Mayne Nickless v. Pegler (1974) 1 NSWLR 228 (SC), at 239 per Samuels J;
Zu rich General Corp. Ltd. v. William Symondson
& Co. (1911) 16 Com Cas 109, at 119;
Babatsikos
v. Car Owners' Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd. (1970) VR 297 (SC), at 396-207;
Avon House Ltd v. Corngill Insurance Co Ltd (1980) 1 ANZ Insurance
Cases #60-429
(NZHC),
at 77, 227-72,
228; Elston v. Phonix Prudential
Australia
Ltd. (1987)
4

ANZ Insurance Cases #60-765 (QSC).
40

(1994)

712, 713, 714 and 732-733.

Rep 476 (CA), at 4492, 510-511

3 WLR, at 680-681.

and 529.
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to be "influenced"
by a circumstance
which, if disclosed, would
not have affected the acceptance of the risk or the amount of the
premium. On behalf of the underwriters,
[it was] submitted that a
circumstance was material if a prudent insurer would have "wanted
to know" or would have "taken into account" that circumstance
even though it would have made no difference
of the risk or the amount or the premium."

to his acceptance

Lord Lloyd - so far as is known, no descendant of the aromatic Edward
- presented
"two separate but closely related questions" to be asked of an
insurer who seeks to avoid a contract of insurance for non-disclosure
or misrepresentation: 41
"(1) Did the misrepresentation
of non-disclosure
induce the actual
insurer to enter into the contract on those terms? (2) Would the
prudent insurer bave entered into the contract on the same terms if
he bad known of the misrepresentation
of the misrepresentation
or
non-disclosure
immediately before the contract concluded? If both
questions are answered in favour of the insurer, he will be entitled
to avoid the contract, but not otherwise."
"Normally",
evidence of the actual insurer
him or herself will be required to satisfy the court in respect of question (1). Evidence of an independent broker or insurer will ordinarily be given to satisfy the court in respect of
question (2).42
The effect of the decision

of the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic

was to

approve43 the approach of Kerr J in Berger v Pollock.44 This was one which as
Kerr LJ, as his Lordship had become, he recanted in CTI.45 Judicial first tboughts
are usually the best.46
THE HOUSE

OF LORDS

DECISION

AND AUSTRALIAN

LA W

In the context of the Australian Marine Insurance Act, whether an insurer need actually be influenced by the non-disclosure depends upon the meaning
to be attributed to the words: 'wbicb would influence the judgement of a pru-

41

Pan Atlantic

Insurance

Co Ltd v. Pine Top Insurance

Co. Ltd. (1994) 3 IVLR 677 (HL),

at 732-733.
42

Ibid. at 733.

43

Ibid.

at 732.

44

(1973) 2 Lloyd's

Rep 442 (QB), at 463.

45

(1984) 2 Lloyd's

Rep 476 (CA), at 495.

Barclay

(Aust)

46

Holdings

514 (CA), at 520.

Pty Ltd.

v. British

National

Insurance

Co. Ltd. (1987) 8 NSIVLR

42
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dent insurer", in s 24(2) of the Act. While there is Australian authority tending
toward the requirement
that the insurer should actually have been induced by
the non-disclosure
of a material factY that question of interpretation48
has not
yet been finally determined by Australian law. There are, I think, two substantive matters of legal principle which would favour the adoption in Australia of
the holding established by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic.
First, the identical wording of the provisions concerned49 and the legislative history of the Australian Marine Insurance Act make the decision of the
House of Lords extremely persuasive. As has been said many times, this is an
area of the law where judges must be willing to subordinate their own fancies
to the needs of common international
legal principles understood throughout a
global industry.
Secondly, the law has generally required that, before an aggrieved party
can seek redress for a wrong suffered by him or her, as the result of another's
statement or omission, the aggrieved party must have been induced by, and
therefore actually relied upon, that statement or omission. Lord Mustill in Pan
Atlantic50 of the general law of misrepresentation:
... it is beyond doubt that even a fraudulent misrepresentation
must
be shown to have induced the contract before the promisor has a
right to avoid, although the task of proof may be made more easy
by a presumption
of inducement. The case of innocent misrepre-

47

In Western Australian
Insllrance Co Ltd v. Dayton
whom Gavan Duffy J agreed) said, at 379-380:

(1924)

35 CLR 355, Issacs

The rest of materiality
is whether in view of "all the circumstances
include of course, the full circumstances
of the fact undisclosed,
influenced
the Company as a prudent insurer in fixing the premium
accept the risk. But it must not be forgotten that "the circumstances"
edge, the practice and the proved conduct of the insurer. If, for
know practice of a company to disregard a certain class of facts,
such a fact would not prima facie qua that company be material,
with regard to another company. (emphasis added).

ACJ (with

at the time", which
that fact would have
or in determining
to
include the knowlinstance,
it were the
the non-disclosure
of
however it might be

See also, Barclay Holdings (Asllst) Pty Ltd. v. British National Insurance Co. Ltd. (1987)
8 NSWLR 514 (CA), at 517, 520 and 525; Visscher Enterprises
Pty Ltd. v. Southem
Pacific Insurance Co. Ltd. (1981) QdR 561 (FC), at 587-588; Itobar Pty Ltd. v. Mackinnon
and Commercial
Union Assurance
Co. PLC (1985) 3 ANZ Insurance
Cases #60-610
(QSC), at 78, 72-78, 723.
48

In Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. (1994) 3 WLR 677 (HL)
the House of Lords considered
this issue in the context of the Marine Insurance
Act
1906 (UK). In that case the resolution
of the issue was considered
to be a matter of
interpretation
of the provisions of the Act. See, esp. at 681-682 per Lord Goff of Chieveley
and at 712 per Lord Mustill.
Act 1906 (UK), s 18(2) and Marine
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sentation should surely be a fortiori, and yet is urged that so long
as the representation
is material no inducement need be shown.51
Similarly,
the various52 doctrines of estoppel have, as a fundamental
precondition
to the granting of relief, required that the aggrieved party should
have reasonably
relied upon (and therefore been induced to act to his or her
detriment by) the representation
of, or assumption or expectation
encouraged
by, Ihe other party. 53 Legislation protecting the rights of consumers similarly
requires a causal connection between, for example, a misleading or deceptive
representation
or conduct and the contract by which loss or damage is suffered.54
For these reasons should the issue arise before an Australian court, it is
likely that the court would adopt the reasoning and process of interpretation
outlined in the Pan Atlantic. But I will say no more in case the issue falls to be
detennined
by me judicially. I should hate to be disqualified
from exercising
an independent
mind on the matter.
SOME GENERAL
CONNECTION

COMMENTS

ON THE DESIRABILITY

OF A CAUSAL

Leaving aside the two questions just dealt with, there are some general
comments which can be made of the causal requirement
propounded
by the
House of Lords in Pan Atlantic. The English Court of Appeal has been much
and variously criticised55 for its decision in CT!. It is particularly
relevant to
consider two of those general criticisms.

51

See a/so, Spencer
(3rd ed 1974).

Bower

and Turner,

The Law of Actionable

Misrepresentation

1304

52

Meagher,
Gummow and Lehane, Equity - Doctrines
and Remedies para 1701 (3rd ed)
(1992) make the point that the term" "estoppel"
has been used in various senses in the
law. But there has never been agreement
as to the doctrinal significance
of the various
senses of the term or as to their relationship,
each to the others." See a/so, Discount and
Finance Ltd. v. Gehrig's New South Wales Wines Ltd. (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 598 (FC), at
602-603 per Jordan CJ; Legoine v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, at 430 per Mason and
Deane JJ.

53

See, for example,
Waltons Stores (Interstate)
Ltd. v. Maher (1988)
429 per Brennan J, which Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, at para
lates the "current state of authority
as to equitable or promissory
Silov; Pty Ltd. v. Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466 (CA), at 472
regards estoppel by conduct, see, The Commonwealth
v. Verwayen
at 444 poer Deane J.

54

See, for example,
Miller, Annotated

55

In Pan Atlantic
Insurance
Co. Lt.d v. Pine Top Insurance
Co. Ltd. (1994) 3 WLR 677
(HL). at 692-695, Lord Mustill outlines nine of the "principal"
complaints
made against
the Court of Appeal's
decision
in Container
Transport
Intemational
Inc v. Oceanus
Mutual Underwriting
Association
(Bermuda) Ltd. (1984) 1 Lloyd's Rep 476(CA).

164 CLR 387, at 428(1710)
say encapsuestoppel."
See also,
per Priestley
JA. As
(1990) 170 CLR 394,

s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the commentary
Trade Practices
Act (15th ed), LBC, 1994, pp. 231-233.
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First, it had been suggested that the law as established by eTI was "too
harsh" in that it deprived "the assured of recovery for a genuine loss by perils
insured against even if the misrepresentation or non-disclosure had no bearing
on the risk which brought about the loss."56 Lord Templeman in Pan Atlantic
said.57 in emphatic terms:
If this is the result of the judgements of the Court of Appeal in the
[CTI] case then I must disapprove of that case. If accepted, this
submission would give carte blanche to the avoidance of insurance contracts on vague grounds of non-disclosure supported by
vague evidence even though disclosure would not have made any
difference.
Having reached the conclusion they did, it is implicit that the Law Lords
in Pan Atlantic accepted, or at least approved the substance of, this criticism.
It is not hard to see why it is entirely inappropriate that an insurer, commonly
possessed of great knowledge and resources, should be able to avoid a contract
of insurance upon the flimsy basis that although it was not itself actually
induced or influenced by the non-disclosure to enter into the contract upon the
terms that it did (and full disclosure would not have altered its acceptance of
the risk upon those terms), such disclosure would have influenced the acceptance of the risk or its terms by a "prudent" insurer. Indeed, Lord Mustill in
Pan Atlantic suggested that, but for the absence of express words of causal
connection in the provisions concerned.58
........ I doubt whether it would nowadays occur to anyone that it
would be possible for the underwriter to escape liability even if
the matter complained of had no effect on his process of thought.
The import of requirement of a causal connection is consistent with the
"voice" which the doctrines of misrepresentation and non-disclosure have long
sought to deter.59 That voice is not that the insurer has underwritten a risk
which has resulted in a loss, but that a breach of the duty of utmost good faith
"has led the underwriter to approach the proposal on a false basis. "60 As a
matter of logic, it ought not be said that an insurer's intention to create legal
relations, nor the consensus ad idem, could be vitiated by circumstances which

56
57

Pan Atlantic Insurace Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. (1994) 3 WLR 677 (HL),
at 692 per Lord Mustill.
Ibid. at 680-681.

58

Ibid. at 705.

59

Contrast Pan Atlantic Insurace Co. Ltd. v. pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. (1994) 3 WLR
677 (HL), at 692, who says that while the requirement of a causal connection has "practical force ..... it is not consistent with general principle".

60

Pan Atlantic Insurace Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd. (1994) 3 WLR 677 (HL),
at 692 per Lord MustilI.
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would not influence the insurer's decision to enter into the contract. Similarly,
where the insurer has impliedly waived reliance upon some of the terms of the
assured's offer, by the fact that those terms would not actually influence the
judgment of the insurer, then that contract ought not be vitiated by a later
assertion by the insurer that those impliedly waived terms are in fact applicable to entitle it to escape the obligations otherwise assumed.
It had been sugg@sted that the law was "too harsh" in that it deprived
"the assured of his recovery even if full and accurate disclosure would have
done no more than cause the actual underwriter, or the hypothetical prudent
underwriter to insist on one rate of premium rather than another. "61 I would
agree with Lord Mustill62 that there is an element of prima facie attractiveness
about the solution which involves an element of "proportionality". In the case
of "innocent" non-disclosure, a concept of "proportionality" could take a number of forms, two of which include:
(1)

that the insurer pay to the insured a proportion of the claim, calculated by reference to the difference between the premium which
was in fact paid and the premium which would have been payable
had there been full disclosure; and

(2)

that the assured be required to pay the correct premium payable
had there initially been full disclosure before the insurer will be
required to pay the claim.63

Assuming the insurer to be unable to show that the non-disclosure was
anything but "innocent", a number of possibilities arise which detract from the
initial attractiveness of a concept of "proportionality". The concept involves
an element of self-insurance: tacitly encouraging assureds not to make full
disclosure in an attempt to benefit from a lower premium. Those assureds so
inclined are invited by the concept of "proportionality" to chance a non-disclosure upon the basis that, should that non-disclosure be datalogued, by a court
or otherwise, to be "innocent", recovery from the insurer will still be possible,
either at a reduced level or after further payment. The premium being the
driving factor in such an invitation, it i~ likely that those who can least afford
the premium, and therefore the total failure to recover, are placed in a situation where such temptation can be least afforded. Indeed, the second formation
offers a positive incentive to withhold material circumstances, the full amount
being recoverable after the payment of an additional amount to the insurer. A
lifetime in the law has demonstrated to me (and doubtless others even less
61
62

Ibid, at 693 per Lord Mustill.
Id.

63

Law Commision
of England and Wales, Insurance
Law:
Warranty
(No. 104), para 4.4f (1980). See also s 28(3)
1984 (Cth), extracted at n. 76 infra.

Non-Disclosure
and Breach of
of the Insurance
Contract
Act
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naif> that some people are not as honest and noble as we would like to think
they are. People otherwise honest and noble may be driven by adverse circumstances to act in a manner contrary to their usual conduct. Thus, while the
concept of proportionality
has real merit, it also presents problems which need
to be considered, apart from practical issues such as the difficulty involved in
assessing claims.64
Closely related is the suggestion that the "prudent insurer" test of materiality should be sharpened by the introduction of a "decisive influence test".
After CT!, the test of materiality became all important as the sole ground for
allowing
the insurer to avoid the contract of insurance
for non-disclosure.
Implicit in the "decisive influence test" was the assumption
that an insurer
would not be able to avoid the contract in circumstances
where full disclosure
would not have altered the insurer's acceptance of the risk. That is, a circumstance would be "material" only if it would have had a decisive effect on the
insurer's acceptance or otherwise of the risk, adj udged by the standard of the
objective prudent insurer.65 By that test of materiality,
an attempt had been
made to move the actual inducement requirement
from the creation of the
contract to the materiality
of circumstances
to be disclosed. The House of
Lords in Pan Atlantic rejected the "decisive influence test" as capable of implication into s 18(2) of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906.66 While the
"decisive influence" test of materiality and the imposition of a requirement
for
causal connection between the non-disclosure
of a material circumstance
and
the entering of a contract of insurance are both connected with the requirement
of actual inducement, the practical effect of the "decisive influence" test may
be the encouragement
of an unduly restrictive passage of information between
the assured and the insurer. The Law Lords decided that his was not desirable
as a matter of legal policy. A risk of the "decisive influence" test was that
assureds would disclose only circumstances
which they were advised would be
of "decisive influence" to the prudent insurer. Aware of that fact, a truly careful insurer would have to inquire for itself, specifically, as to all those circumstances which, while not "decisive" would collectively
influence the assessment and acceptance
of the risk. Of course, the insurer's gathering of such
information
would have a price. It is not unreasonable
to suppose that, ultimately, the consumers of goods which had been subject of some form of marine insurance would pay that price.
Leaving
64

65

aside

the merits

of the extent

presently

re-

The Law Commission
of England and Wales ultimately
rejected the concept of proportionality upon the basis that it would be too difficult to assess claims. See, Law Commission of England and Wales, Insurance Law: non-Dsiclosure
and Breach of Warranty
(No.
104) para 4.2-4.31 and 10.6 (1980).

Pall Atlantic Insurace Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. (1994)
at 683 per Lord Goff of Chieveley.

66

of the disclosure

Ibid, at 682-683,695-696,705,713

and 714.

3 WLR 677 (HL),
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quired, the approach adopted by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic encourages full disclosure of all material circumstances
which collectively,
as opposed to individually,
are decisive upon the assessment and acceptance of the
risk. That approach does not place any burden extra to that already upon insurers to gather information
and thereby avoids the potential of that extra cost.
Given the desirability
of the need of actual inducement,
the approach of the
House of Lords in Pan Atlantic appears to achieve this object in a more cost
appropriate manner than that offered by the "decisive influence" test of materiality. However, as will be discussed below, the present test of materiality
as
endorsed by Pan Atlantic is itself is open to criticism upon the different basis
that it places too onerous a task on an assured seeking to comply with the
disclosure obligation.
AUSTRALIAN

REFORMS

IN THE FIELD

OF GENERAL

INSURANCE

As the preceding discussion suggests, at least in the context of marine
insurance the duty of utmost good faith remains an onerous one, basically as it
has been since Edward Lloyd's day. Reality suggests that the stringent obligations imposed by that duty are felt more by the assureds that the insurers.
Indeed, it is difficult to contemplate
the situation where an assured, having
suffered loss against which it was insured, would seek to avoid the contract of
insurance upon the breach of the duty of good faith.67 Arguably, however, as
the duty of good faith applies also to the manner of performance
of the contract,68 the assured, under a marine insurance policy, ought to be able, in
principle.
to seek some degree of redress where the insurer unjustifiably
asserts that the assured's conduct is such that the insurer ought to be able to
avoid the contract or otherwise performs its obligations under the contract in a
manner contrary to the sense of mutuality and fair dealing imported into the
contract by the duty of utmost good faith.69 But is the doctrine of utmost good
faith in its present manifestation still necessary? Could its purposes be achieved
by other methods?
67

Of course, as Lord Mansfidd
in Carter 1'. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, at 1909; 97 ER
1162, at 1164, if an underwriter
insured a risk he already knew to have been completed
without loss, the assured could avoid the contract of insurance
and the underwriter
be
liable to return the premium.

68

The duty of utmost good faith at least extends to the making of claims
by the assured
him or herself or by his or her agent or broker on his or her behalf. See, Black King
Shipping
Corporation
1'. Massie
(the 'Litsion Pride') (1985) I Lloyd's Rep 437 (QB).

69

For example,
circustances
may arise where general damges will be available
to the
assured for the insurer's
breach of the insurance
contract. See, for example,
Stuart 1'.
Guardian
Royal Excahnge Assurance
of New Zealand Ltd. (No.2) (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases #60-844 (NZHC); Davidson 1'. Guarduiabn Royal Exchange Assurance
(1979)
I Lloyd's Rep 406 (Sc. Ct); Edwards 1'. A A Mutual Insurance
Co. (1985) 3 ANZ Insurance Cases #60-668 (NZHC); Harris 1'. The New Zealand Insurance
Co. Ltd. (1987) 4
ANZ Insurance
Cases #60-817 (NZHC); Kerr v. The State Insurance
General Manager
(1987) 4 ANZ Insurance Cases #60-781 (NZHC); Dome v. The State Insurance
General
Manager (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases #60-835 (NZHC); Moss & Anor v. Sun Alliance
Australia
Ltd. (1990) 3 ANZ Insurance
Cases #60-967 (SASC).
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As a result of recommendations by the Australian Law Reform Commission,7o made at a time when I was its Chairman, substantiative reforms were
introduced to the Australian law of general insurance by the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). Those reforms included reforms to the duty of utmost
good faith, By express provision, the Insurance Contracts Act does not apply
to contracts to which the Marine Insurance Act applies.71
The Australian Law Reform Commission did not propose that the duty
of utmost good faith should be abandoned entirely, in favour of some new
concept. Indeed the Commission recognised the utility of the concept. The
Commission said: 72
The origin of the duty of disclosure lay in the superior knowledge
of factors relevant to the risk which the insured possessed in
early marine insurance, when underwriting expertise was in its
infancy. It is often said that position has, in most cases of insurance, now been reversed: insurers have available to them sophisticated statistical data and obtain information on many aspects of
the risk which they undertake. It is true that the insurer has superior, even exclusive, knowledge of statistical matters relevant to
numerous categories and subcategories of risk. But it does not
have superior knowledge of factors peculiar to the particular risk.
It does not know that the life to be insured has been the subject of
death threats, that a house proposed for insurance has been rewired by its expert owner rather than a qualified electrician, or
that the insured under a house owner's/householder's policy has
been convicted of theft on three separate occasions. Factors such
as these are likely to in the exclusive knowledge of the insured.
There are economic reasons which prevent insurers from making
an independent investigation of each and every proposal, particularly in respect of such classes as house owner's/householder's and
motor vehicle insurance. Prime reliance in these areas must be
placed on the insured's answers to the questions asked of him by
the insurer.
Clearly the Commission recognised the importance of the duty of utmost
good faith and the potential cost of abandoning the doctrine. However, the

70
71

See, The Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts (ALRC 20), (1982).
Section 9 (l) of Insurance Contracts Act 1974 (Cth) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this Act, this Act does not apply to or in relation to
contract and proposed contracts(d) to or in relation to which the Marine Insurance Act 1909 applies ...

72

The Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts (ALRC 20), AGPS, 1982, at para
175.
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Commission disagreed with the then exposition of the duty of utmost good
faith as it applied to general insurance. The Commission said:73
Even so, there is little doubt that the principle of disclosure requires modification. The doctrine of uberrima fides does not justify a rule which requires the insured to show more than the utmost good faith. Under the existing test, the insured is required
to disclose not only those facts whose relevance to the contract he
does or should, as a reasonable man, appreciate, but also facts of
whose relevance he is quite ignorant. It has been argued that the
existing duty is justified on the basis of the underwriter's need for
full information for detailed assessment of risks. Nobody, underwriters included, would suggest that the insured be under an absolute duty of disclosure, even in respect of the facts of which he is
quite ignorant. Yet facts of that type are also relevant to assessment of the risk. It is widely recognised that a new balance should
be struck between the underwriter's need for information and the
insured's need for security in relying upon insurance. (emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
In essence, the Australian Law Reform Commission took issue with the
"prudent insurer" test of materiality of general insurance. Against the nature of
the duty of utmost good faith in the context of marine insurance, the substantive reforms effected by the Insurance Contracts Act are:
(1)

73

[d.

74

Sec.tion

A matter will be "material" in the context of general insurance if
the insured knows (or reasonable person in the insured circumstances could be expected to know) that a matter would be relevant to the decision of the particular insurer to accept the risk
and if so upon what terms.74 Hence, the law adopts a "particular
insurer" and "actual or reasonable insured" test of materiality. Similarly,
in contrast to the situation in marine insurance, the assured in
general insurance is not deemed to have constructive knowledge
of the material facts, materiality in general insurance concerning
itself only with "every matter that is known to the insured";75 and

21(1)

of the Insurance

Contracts

ACt 1984 (Cth) provides:

Subject to this Act, an insured has a duty to disclose to the insurer, before the relevant
contract of insurance
is entered into, every matter that is known to the insured, being a
matter that-

75

(a)

the insured knows to be a matter relevant to the decision
to accept the risk and, if so, on what terms; or

(b)

a reasonable
person
matter so relevant.

Insurance

Contracts

in the circumstances

Act 1984(Cth),

s 21(1).

could

of the insurer

be expected

to know

whether
to be a
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In contrast
to the insurer's
ability to avoid entirely
the contract
of
insurance
for a breach of the duty of disclosure
in the context
of
marine
insurance,
an insurer
in the context
of general
insurance
can only avoid entirely
the contract
of insurance
for non-disclosure where
that non-disclosure
is fraudulent,
but not where
the
insurer would have entered
same terms had there been

into the contract
full disclosure.

of insurance
upon the
Where the non-disclo-

sure is not fraudulent
then the insurer's
liability
is limited
to an
amount
which would place the insurer in a position
had there been
full disclosure.76
Clearly,
the remedies
of the insurer
for non-disclosure
are significantly
restricted.
Significant
also is the imposition of a causality
requirement
in a manner
similar
to that now
implied
by the House of Lords in Pan A/lan/ic and the imposition
of the concept
of "proportionality"
plained
of is not fraudulent.

where

the non-disclosure

com-

Do these developments
in the field of the Australian
law of general
insurance
demonstrate,
or suggest,
that the doctrine
of utmost
good faith in
marine
insurance
is out of date? In principle,
No. A contract
of insurance
remains
a contract
based upon speculation.
The underwriting
of that speculation is very largely dependent
upon the underwriter's
ability to properly
assess
the risk. It remains
the case that despite
the ever increasing
general
information held by the insurers,
the assured
normally
has the particular
and peculiar
knowledge
of its venture.
Normally
the assured
knows
the facts which
are
ultimately
determinative
for the acceptance
of the risk and, if so, upon what
conditions
and for what price. Nevertheless,
it is my view that the present
manifestation
of reform.

76

of that duty

of utmost

good

faith

in the field

of marine

is in need

Section 28 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984(Cth) provides:
(I).

This section applies where the person who became the insured under a contract
of general insurance upon the contract being cntered into(a)
(b)

failed to comply with the duty of disclosure; or
made a misrepresentation to the insurer before the contract was entered
into.
but does not apply where the insurer would have entered into the contract
for the same premium and on the same terms and conditions even if the
insured had not failed to comply the duty of disclosure or had not failed
to comply with the duty of disclosurc or had not made the misrepresentation before the contract was entered into.

(2)
(3)

If the failure was fraudulent or the misrepresentation was made fraudulently, the
insurer may avoid the contract.
If the insurer is not entitled to avoid the contract or, being entitled to avoid the
contract (whether under sub-section (2) or otherwise has not done so, the liability of the insurer in respect of a claim is reduced to the amount that would place
him in a position in which he would have been if the failure had not occurred or
the misrepresentation had not been made.
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LA W IN AUSTRALIA

I will assume that, in that absence of specific legislative enactment on
the point, the Australian courts would follow the lead of the House of Lords in
Pan Atlantic. They will imply into the Marine Insurance Ac,f that redress for
non-disclosure,
or indeed misrepresentation,
must be conditional
upon that
non-disclosure
having actually induced the insurer to enter into the contract of
insurance upon the terms and conditions it did. Such an approach resolves, at
least to some degree, two difficulties which might otherwise require reform:
First, it avoids the situation which existed before Pan Atlantic, by which the
law, in England at least, allowed an insurer to avoid a contract entirely where
full disclosure would not have made any difference to its accepting the risk in
fact. Secondly, it adds a reference to the "particular
insurer" as well as the
"prudent insurer". That is, although the standard of materiality remains objectively that of the "prudent insurer", the subjective effect of the non-disclosure
on the particular insurer is ultimately determinative.
Both of these developments have the effect of curtailing imprudent underwriting
practices by particular underwriters.
It would no longer be open to such underwriters
to seek
the court's assistance to avoid such an imprudently
struck bargain upon the
basis that a hypothetical
"prudent insurer" would have been influenced by the
circumstance
had it been disclosed. This is especially the case where an underwriter accepts a risk upon the basis of the risks' acceptability within the underwriter's
own global risk management
strategy. That is, if it could be shown that an
underwriter accepted the risk upon the predominant or sole basis that its information and information systems deem the risk acceptable. then it could hardly
be said that the underwriter was actually induced to enter into the contract by
any disclosure or non-disclosure
of the assured. Avoidance of the contract of
insurance
for non-disclosure
in those circumstances
will be seriously challenged by the requirement of actual inducement. It seems likely that the principles established by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic in this respect would
be adopted by the Australian courts. But is this enough?
There is a rather draconian element in the present law which allows the
total avoidance of the contract of insurance for the assured's non-disclosure,
fraudulent or otherwise. This is especially the case in marine insurance where
materiality,
in theory, can be so remote from the actual assured as a circumstance constructively
known by the assured and influential
to the mind of
prudent insurer, but actually unknown and irrelevant to the assured.77 Of course,
one must take into account that ordinarily the players in a bargain of marine
insurance are not consumer and highly resourced insurance company, as is the
case ordinarily
in general insurance. Parties to a marine insurance contract
tend toward greater, although rarely equal, equality of bargaining power. They
ordinarily engage in contracts of marine insurance as a matter of course, not
exceptionally.
If these are the circumstances
in which the marine insurance is
77

Mari ne Insurance

Act 1909 (Cth).

ss 24( I) and 24(2).
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written then the law is perhaps right to demand higher standards that those
expected in the general insurance marketplace. Indeed, many of the reforms
implemented by the Insurance Contracts Act were aimed at redressing this
perceived imbalance apt for the typical insured in a general insurance situation.
Be that as it may, such a blanket remedy for non-disclosure, regardless
of the nature of the parties to the contract, in my view, could involve a risk of
injustice. While I would welcome reform in this area of marine insurance, one
can perceive considerable difficulties in the evolution of an appropriate system
of remedies. As discussed above, a concept of "Proportionality" would be
attractive. However, it does seem to involve an arguably unacceptable element
of self-insurance and temptation inappropriate to marine insurance. Before such
evolution is complete, the need for causality as laid down by the House of
Lords in Pan Atlantic provides a partially effective method of stemming inappropriate access by non-induced insurers to this rather draconian blanket remedy. However, it does nothing for the plight of the assured who fall before the
actually induced prudent insurer.
In Barclay Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v. British National Insurance
Co Ltd,n a case concerning the common law, I expressed the view that the test
of materiality79 as endorsed by the English Court of Appeal in CT!, was too

broad in scope "because the latter may impose an obligation on an insured to
disclose virtually endless material about the insured's pasl."80 I expressed concerns that it was unreasonable to expect an insured to know, in any detail, the
kinds of considerations which may influence the decisions of insurers,8l let
alone the kinds of consideration which may influence the decision of a foreign
insurer in a foreign marketplace.82 Yet that was the extent of disclosure recase, and therefore by
quired by the test of materiality laid down in the
the English Marine Insurance Act. I preferred the local test, expressed by
Samules J in Mayne Nickless Ltd v Pegler,83 where his Honour spoke of a
circumstance being "material" if it "would have reasonably affected the mind
of a prudent insurer in determining whether he will accept the insurance, and
if so, at what premium and on what conditions." The words "reasonably af-

en

8 NSWLR 514 (CA).

78

(1987)

79

Kerr LJ in Container Transport International Inc. v. Oceans Mutual Underwriting
ciation (Bermuda) Ltd. (1984) I Lloyd's Rep 476 (CA), at 492, said the word
enced" in the test, "which would influence
the judgment
of a prudent insurer"
"that the disclosure
is one which would have had an impact on the formation
opinion and on his decision-making
process ....•

81

(1987) 8 NSWLR, 518 (CA).
Ibid., at 517.

82

Ibid., at 518.

83

(1974)

80

1 NSWLR, 228 (SC), at 239.

Asso"influmeant
of his
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feeted" in Samuels 1's test, I considered:84
" .. to require that the effect on the mind of the insurer... should be
something more than the effect produced by information which
the insurer would have been generally interested to have. If, though
interested to have it, such information would not, in the end, have
determined for a reasonably prudent insurer the acceptance or rejection of insurance, the setting of the premium or the attachment
of conditions, there is not such effect on tbe mind as requires
disclosure. The information, although of interest, is not material.
As such it is not information which must be disclosed by the
insured."
Upon reflection, this was in effect, as was the "decisive" influence test
submitted in Pan Atlantic, an attempt to move tbe desirable causal requirement, or lack thereof, from relevance to the creation of the contract to the rest
of materiality. Of course, the test of materiality favoured by me in Barclay
Holdings did not go as far as tbe "decisive influence" test unsuccessfully
advocated before the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic. But it may bave gone
further than that endorsed by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic. By that
decision, a material circumstance is one that would have an effect on the mind
of a prudent insurer.85 While it is difficult to ascertain, the practical effect of a
test of materiality based upon notions of causality and a nondisclosure causality requirement in the creation of the contract of insurance may be identical, if
not very similar. Yet, even if that is the case, such a broad concept of "materiality" as applies in tbe context of the Marine Insurance Act continues to impose an indisputably burdensome responsibility on the assured. The assured
must disclose all tbat would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer, having regard to all material circumstances. No relief offered to the assured. For
the reasons wbich I expressed in Barclay Holdings I consider that it is desirable that the duty of disclosure be made some what more narrow tban tbat
wbicb is presently the case.
I return to the question posed by my title. Is the doctrine of utmost good
faith so out of date that it should be entirely abandoned? Tbe answer is no. In
Australia, tbere is remedial legislation designed to protect those who bargain
from misrepresentation.86
Other legislation, in State jurisdictions, allows certain bargains to be re-written by tbe courts in certain circumstances.87 Nevertheless, the remedies and redress presently available, by the common law or
84
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at 682683,695-696,705,713
and 714. per Lord Mustill.
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otherwise, would nOl adequately or appropriately fill the high gaps which would
be left by the abandonment
of the duty of utmost good faith, in any field of
insurance. Indeed, if the doctrine were to be abandoned I have no doubt "the
common law, being the creation of reason"88 would ultimately arrive again at a
substantially
similar doctrine purely because the essential nature of insurance
has not changed since its early days, nor is there reason to suppose that it will
so change in the future. In some way, the law would have to oblige assureds to
supply insurers with vital, relevant information to permit insurers to assess the
risk. and, if accepted, to fix the premium.
THE REQUIREMENT
METHOD

OF UTMOST

GOOD FAITH

AND THE JUDICIAL

A concepl such as "utmost good faith" will often draw criticism upon
the basis that, by its vague wording, it is uncertain and without concrete or at
least clear meaning. This drove the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court
of South Africa in Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v. Oudtshoorn Municipality to say that the expression uberrima fides was an "alien, vague, useless expression without any particular meaning in law", not being capable of
being used in their law for the purpose of explaining the juristic basis of the
duty to disclose a material fact". That being so, the Appellate Division was of
the firm view that "our law of insurance has no need for uberrima fides and
the time has come to jettison it."89
Yet, the juristic base of much of the common law of Australia rests upon
concepts and doctrines which, when considered in the abstract, are both uncertain and without meaning. For, example, fundamental to the law of negligence
are the concepts of the "reasonable
person", "reasonable
foreseeability"
and
"proximity" .90 Equity looks to concepts such as "unconscionable
dealing"91
and the "unconscientious
departure" from the subject matter of an assumption.92 Contract permits recovery of damages in the event of breach if such
88

Mason v. Tritton (Ncw South Walcs Court of Appeal,
of the author's

unreported,

30 August

1994),

at 23

judgment.
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1985 (I) AD 419 (SASC(App.
Div)), at 433. The Court held, after a review of the
manner of reception
of law into South Africa and the juristic development
of the law
relating
to marine insurance,
that the law of South Africa did not recognise
uberrima
fides as category of good faith. Rather, the Roman-Dutch
juristic base of South African
law recognised
only bona fides and mala fides as categories
of good faith. An Ordinance
of 1570 made a contract of insurance "indisputably
a contract bona fides": ibid, at 432.
Upon that basis the Court held that materiality
was to be tested by deciding,
upon
consideration
of the relevant facts of the particular case. whether or not the undisclosed
information
or facts were reasonably
relative to the risk or the assessment
of the premiums, adjudged by the reasonable
man: ibid, at 435.
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loss "may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of both
parties" at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach
of it.93 One seeks to overturn criminal convictions upon the ground that they
were "unsafe and unsatisfactory."94
Or to claim that an opponent's
legal professional privilege has been impliedly waived because it would be "unfair" or
"misleading"
that it be maintained.95 Before a lawyer can even begin to imagine the· uncertainty of these concepts he or she must become the subject matter
of another one: that is, they must be of "good fame and character."96 The point
to be made is that our law is often founded upon doctrines of wide and varied
import. This is not by accident. We should respect and be thankful for their
breadth. They may indeed introduce elements of uncertainty. But they permit
courts - judges and juries - on behalf of the community to continue the neverending search for justice in the particular case.
The judicial method in common law countries is assisted by concepts
such as the doctrine of utmost good faith. Only when the courts are armed with
such concepts can they fairly resolve the particular circumstances
of the many
and varied cases corning before them, doing so in a just and fair manner.
Inflexible formulae and precise rules, whilst they may achieve certainty in the
marketplace,
lend themselves to injustices; the applicable doctrine having no
inherent flexibility to deal with the nuances of differing fact situations. At the
risk of Denning-like
recitation of my dissenting opinions, 1 can instance a
recent example in my own Court. The New South Wales Court of Appeal
considered
the rule which prohibits a beneficiary
to a will from benefiting
under that will if they killed the testator. The particular circumstances
of the
case were that a woman had, after years of abuse from her husband, finally
killed him. Under the husband's
will the wife was to benefit. In criminal
proceedings
the defence of "diminished responsibility"
had been established.
The majority of the court of Appeal, holding themselves bound by the inflexible forfeiture rule, decided that the woman was prohibited from benefiting
under the will. Not a cent could she recover, although the evidence disclosed

93
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that by her work and efforts in the jointly owned business over many years,
she had contributed most materially to the husband's property and estate. It
was, in my view, an unjust result. But it was one which the inflexible rule of
law demanded.97 Certainty triumpl1ed over justice in the particular case, which
suggested a more finely tuned outcome.
It is therefore not a proper criticism, in itself, that the doctrine of utmost
good faith in marine insurance and other insurance law is of wide import and
of wide potential and sometimes unjust application. In theory, a doctrine of
such a nature is desirable as it provides the courts with a legitimate means of
achieving just and fair results in each particular case. It encourages disclosure
of relevant information by assureds to insurers. It reduces the business costs of
interrogations which may otherwise be based on ignorance of material circumstances. It has endured in insurance for a very long time. It is a feature of the
rules of a global industry in which Australia's share is modest indeed.
CONCLUSION-THE
MORE TREATMENT

DOCTRINE

IS NOT OUT DATE;

BUT REQUIRES

The nature of the insurance contract having remained basically the same
through the ages, perpetuating the need for substantial disclosure, it cannot
be properly said that the doctrine of utmost good faith is out of date.
However, the contemporary manifestation of this doctrine in the context of
marine insurance is, in my view, in need of further substantive reform.
It is imperative that an element of causality be introduced into the
doctrine. In that respect the decision of the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic
may offer a desirable judicial reform of the pre-existing understanding of the
law. It is similarly desirable that the test of materiality should be modified
so as to control somewhat the onerous burden which it now presents to the
assured who seeks faithfully and honestly to comply with it. However, that
modification should not go so far as to encourage an unduly restrictive flow
of information between the parties.
Finally, consideration needs to be given to the evolution of a system of
remedies for non-disclosure whereby certain types of non-disclosure will not
automatically entitle the insurer to avoid the contract entirely. This has been
achieved in Australia in the field of general insurance. But the lead will
have to come from those countries which are most heavily involved in
writing marine insurance. That is why international conferences such as this
provide a useful forum for the exchange of experience and the discussion of
desirable reform which may catch the ear of a legislator or, more likely, a
judge having power to do something to secure reform.
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